

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160007-7

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1 of 1

Trends in Communist Media

6 Aug 75

No. 31

~~Confidential~~

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST  
INFORMATION SERVICE

# Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

6 AUGUST 1975  
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 31)

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## CONTENTS

### EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

Brezhnev Speech Moderate on Most Controversial Issues . . . . .	1
East Europe Hails Helsinki Results, Cautious on Freer Access . . . . .	3
Peking Says CSCE Encourages Greater Superpower Rivalry . . . . .	6
DRV Ignores Ford Meetings With Brezhnev, East European Leaders. . . . .	8

### U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow Notes SALT Progress in Ford-Brezhnev Talks . . . . .	9
---	---

### U.S.-EAST EUROPE RELATIONS

Romania, Yugoslavia Voice Satisfaction With Ford Visits . . . . .	11
---	----

### SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Peking Presses Charges Against Soviet Asian Security Plan . . . . .	13
---	----

### KOREA

DPRK Registers Formal Opposition to ROK UN Membership . . . . .	15
---	----

### INDOCHINA

Cambodia Notes Le Duan Visit, Discusses Foreign Policy Issues . . . . .	16
Hanoi Media Step Up Criticism of Bangkok Policy Toward U.S. . . . .	19

### PORTUGAL

USSR Criticizes "Western Media" Interference, Attacks Soares . . . . .	22
--	----

### CHINA

Lo Jui-ching Appearance Highlights Peking Army Day Reception . . . . .	25
--	----

### NOTE

Lifting of OAS Cuba Sanctions . . . . .	27
---	----

### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . .	i
---	---

CONFIDENTIAL

F-115 FRIENDS  
6 AUGUST 1975

- 1 -

## EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

## BREZHNEV SPEECH MODERATE ON MOST CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

The speech by CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at the 31 July session of the Helsinki summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was moderate and conciliatory in tone. Although Brezhnev reiterated standard Soviet positions on the major controversial issues, he avoided any show of arrogance, stressing instead the themes of "consensus" and "compromise" in his characterization of the conference agreements. In his one statement that carried an abrasive edge, his warning against interference in Soviet internal affairs, Brezhnev did not go beyond the positions that have been repeatedly set forth in the media for many months.

Soviet and East European media have made a big play over Brezhnev's call for turning political detente into military detente. But in fact--aside from expressing general interest in continuing to pursue military detente--the Soviet leader offered no new initiatives in his indirect references to the Vienna force reduction talks and the strategic arms limitation talks in Geneva. He said only that "one of the first priority objectives is to find ways to reduce armed forces and armaments in central Europe without diminishing the security of anyone," and "uppermost in our minds is the task of ending the arms race and achieving tangible results in disarmament."

Brezhnev said the Soviet Union viewed the outcome of the conference "not merely as a necessary summing up of the political results of World War II," but as an "insight into the future in terms of the realities of today," a carefully drafted phrase which sidestepped the concept of "inviolability of borders." Pre-summit Soviet comment had stressed this principle, but Brezhnev in avoiding it seemed to take cognizance of Western criticism that the USSR's prime concern with CSCE was in nailing down Western recognition of World War II borders.

While Soviet comment in the past tended to ignore the agreements on cooperation in the humanitarian field, Brezhnev referred to exchanges of information in both a conciliatory and cautionary fashion. He spoke of possibilities of cooperation in areas "where it was unthinkable in the years of the cold war," as in "broader exchanges of information in the interests of peace and friendship." But he also called it "no secret" that information media "can serve the purpose of peace and confidence or they can spread all over the world the poison of discord," and he expressed the hope that the conference results would serve as a "correct guideline"

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

for cooperation in this field. Soviet concern for this matter was similarly stressed by IZVESTIYA observer Mikhail Mikhaylov on Moscow Radio's international observers roundtable on 3 August: "Those information media which serve the goals of peace and trust" should be "encouraged," but those "who sow dissension between countries and peoples" should "be administered a rebuff," he warned.

Emphasizing the security aspects of the agreement, the Soviet leader stated that the "main conclusion" of the conference was that "no one should try, on the basis of foreign policy considerations of one kind or another, to dictate to other peoples how they should manage their own internal affairs." It is only the people of each given state, and "no one else," he said, who "have the sovereign right to decide their own internal affairs and establish their own internal laws." Mikhaylov, on the observers roundtable program, spelled out one of the implications: The interests of detente would be better served, he said, by developing "mutually beneficial trade that is free from all discrimination," rather than by "fruitless attempts" to "intervene in internal affairs."

Brezhnev stated that the principles drawn up by the conference participants had to be put to practical use and "made a law of international life which is not to be breached by anyone." In effect responding to Western views that the CSCE document had no binding application in law, an article by SOVIET RUSSIA correspondent Viktor Soldatov, as reported by TASS on 1 August, referred to unidentified "pronouncements" that the conference document had "no juridical nature" and was "merely a declaration of intentions which is not binding on anyone." These "skeptics" should be reminded, Soldatov said, that all states have jointly worked up the final document and will sign it at the summit level. "This will impart to it the nature of a solemn pledge," he declared.

TREATMENT OF Moscow's voluminous attention to the Helsinki  
FORD SPEECH summit revolved around Brezhnev as the central figure, with the other leaders accorded due courtesy by way of publication of versions of their speeches in PRAVDA. Moscow radio broadcast short summaries of President Ford's speech in several foreign--chiefly Asian--languages, but Moscow's domestic service reported only that the President had addressed the conference, giving no details.

Excerpts of the President's speech--approximately a third of the full text--appeared on page 7 of the 2 August issue of PRAVDA. The PRAVDA account deleted his remarks relating to the basic principles upon which the United States was founded, as well as his comments, in addressing the countries of the East, that they

- 3 -

should recognize American devotion to human rights and freedoms and thus to the conference pledges regarding freer movement of people, ideas and information. PRAVDA included his observations on the substantial achievements of recent years, but omitted, at the end of that passage, his remarks that "detente can succeed only if everybody understands what detente actually is," and that success of the detente process "depends on new behavior patterns."

The President's comments on MBFR, SALT, and non-proliferation were reproduced in full. But PRAVDA excised, from his remarks on the "special significance" of Berlin, the observation that the CSCE results "apply to Berlin as they do throughout Europe." Nor did PRAVDA include his cautionary statement that "crises must not be manipulated or exploited for unilateral advantages that could lead us again to the brink of war," and his further admonition that "the process of negotiation must be sustained, not at a snail's pace, but with demonstrated enthusiasm and visible progress."

#### EAST EUROPE HAILS HELSINKI RESULTS, CAUTIOUS ON FREER ACCESS

With the expected qualifications from Bucharest and Belgrade, the public assessments of the CSCE emanating from Moscow's East European allies have been uniformly lyrical. The orthodox party leaders' Helsinki speeches and followup media comment echoed Brezhnev's conference speech in stressing that the CSCE was a major achievement of peaceful coexistence, that it enhanced prospects for converting political detente into military detente, and that there were no victors or vanquished but only equal participants in the conference. In stressing equality and welcoming the participation of the non-European countries--the United States and Canada--the East European leaders took pains at the same time to note that the conference had been convened on the initiative of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The party dailies of the USSR, East Germany, and Romania published the full text of the final conference document, while those of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia carried abridged versions.

Yugoslavia's Tito and Romania's Ceausescu registered qualified praise for the conference in their Helsinki speeches, both leaders manifesting caution on the freer access issue and Ceausescu describing as inadequate the final document's provisions for advance notification of troop movements and maneuvers. The Albanian daily BASHKIMI on the 2d portrayed as hypocritical Brezhnev's condemnation of foreign dictation of a country's internal affairs.

The orthodox East European leaders emulated Brezhnev in softpedaling Western acceptance of the post-World War II borders, generally

- 4 -

approaching this issue indirectly by warning against any repetition of territorial conflict in Europe. There were varying degrees of toughness manifested on the issue of more open borders and freer exchange of people and information. In the most inflexible stance on the access issue, the GDR's Honecker stressed that Europe's past troubles had stemmed from disregard for sovereignty and inviolability of borders and that the latter principle was the chief criterion in judging present-day policies of cooperation, declaring in this context that "security is the stable basis for cooperation." Bulgaria's Zhivkov warned that his country's "gates will be open for all people with . . . good and honest intentions who are observing the laws, traditions and customs of the house they are visiting." Czechoslovakia's Husak, sensitive to the airing in the West of the views of "Prague Spring" liberals, asserted that freer exchanges must not be utilized for purposes of propaganda and hate. In more restrained terms, Hungary's Kadar noted that progress in the area of exchanges was possible only with mutual respect for sovereignty and laws, and Poland's Gierk called for "deepening mutual confidence" in implementing the conference's decisions on contacts, in order to avoid repetition of the "tragedies" of the past

In followup comment, Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU on 2 August declared that "Europe has found a common language" and predicted that the Ford-Brezhnev meeting scheduled for that day would have "positive repercussions" on the SALT and MBFR negotiations. On the negative side, the Warsaw military daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI of the same day complained that Radio Free Europe, located on West German territory and financed by American funds, was carrying commentaries on the CSCE which "blatantly" contradicted the official U.S. and FRG positions in support of the conference. Similarly, the editorial in Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 2d combined praise for the conference with a denunciation of alleged efforts by the press "in certain Western countries" to demean and distort the meeting's results and to turn the clock back to the days of the cold war. The East Germans' tough stance was sustained in the 4 August NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial, which cautioned that the term "peaceful coexistence" connoted differing social systems, "that is, a state of antagonism which cannot be done away with merely by good will." The editorial echoed Brezhnev's Helsinki speech in declaring that "no one should try . . . to dictate to other peoples how they should manage their internal affairs." In an interview in the same paper on the 6th, Honecker underscored the impossibility of international cooperation without strict observance of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders.

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CONFIDENTIAL

6 AUGUST 1975

- 5 -

ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA      Romanian party-state leader Ceausescu assessed the security conference positively but asserted that it fell short of Bucharest's expectations. In particular, he termed the final document's provisions for advance notification of maneuvers and troop movements "insufficient," though a positive step, and he reiterated Bucharest's longstanding demand that a permanent body be established to monitor compliance with the final document. Ceausescu also reaffirmed his position that genuine European security requires abolition of blocs, removal of bases and troops from foreign territories, and disarmament.

Ceausescu's expected emphasis on independence and sovereignty included a stinging condemnation of the use of cultural exchanges and information media to encourage "racism, war propaganda and hatemongering." Specifically, he denounced the "misinformation activities" of radio stations "on the territories of some states participating in the current conference"-- an apparent reference to RFE and Radio Liberty. Ceausescu strongly defended Romania's political system under communist rule and asserted that "the democracy that is being achieved in Romania is superior, by far, to the democracy referred to by certain previous speakers."

President Tito used the occasion of the security conference summit to issue a direct appeal for a hands-off policy on Yugoslavia. Reaffirming Belgrade's nonaligned position, he asked for "unconditional respect for the sovereignty and integrity" of Yugoslavia. In commenting on Yugoslavia's relations with its neighbors, Tito also stressed the "binding" nature of the principle of the inviolability of borders. His generally hopeful assessment of the security conference may well have been influenced by his talks with leaders of neighboring states. Reflecting some improvement in Belgrade's continuing difficulties with Bulgaria, a communique on Tito's 30 July talks with Zhivkov, the first since 1967, indicated that their exchange had been "frank and friendly" and that they had agreed on measures to intensify cooperation. Tito also met with Austria's Kreisky, who afterwards forecast improved relations between the two countries.

In contrast to the other East European leaders, Tito expressed a reserved attitude regarding the implications of the CSCE beyond the European continent. Emphasizing the interdependence of Europe with the rest of the world, Tito stressed that detente must not be limited to "agreement-seeking" between the big powers or the blocs. He asserted that many international crises--which exert pressures on nonaligned countries--continue to exist, a situation which "gives rise to suspicion regarding the aims and even the past accomplishments of detente."

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FBIS TRENDS  
6 AUGUST 1975

- 6 -

## PEKING SAYS CSCE ENCOURAGES GREATER SUPERPOWER RIVALRY

Peking has issued an unusually heavy stream of critical comment and reportage on the Helsinki resolutions, characterizing them as ambiguous and self-contradictory documents which allow each superpower to make its own interpretations, thus providing a structure for increased competition in Europe. Peking has aimed the brunt of its criticism at the USSR for "hawking the 'detente' trash," while it has depicted the United States as remaining vigilant against Soviet expansion.

Peking's treatment is consistent with its recent propaganda line, which has held that the superpower rivalry in Europe has reached a "new stage," despite outward signs of East-West relaxation, and that the United States has shifted its attention to Soviet inroads in Europe following U.S. setbacks in Indochina. Peking has focused on recent remarks by President Ford as evidence that Washington intends to use the CSCE framework to enhance its position in Europe against the USSR. NCNA coverage of President Ford's visits to Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, transmitted on 29 July, 3 August and 4 August respectively, played up the developing relations between East Europe and the United States.

A 1 August NCNA report gave special stress to signs of U.S.-Soviet tensions outside the formal Helsinki summit meetings, portraying the Ford-Brezhnev talks of 30 July and 2 August on SALT, MBFR, the Middle East and Portugal as part of the two powers' continued "plotting against each other." Separate meetings by President Ford and Brezhnev with West European leaders and their contacts with the Turkish prime minister were also seen as efforts by both powers to compete for European influence. To underline its case for U.S.-Soviet rivalry, NCNA even went so far as to misquote Secretary Kissinger's remarks regarding the Soviet role in Portugal at a 30 July press conference in Helsinki.

NCNA stated that Kissinger said "detente must not be used by the Soviet Union to intervene in the troubles on our side of the line. Activities by any country in Portugal will be considered as contrary to the letter and the spirit of the principles of the CSCE." In fact, Kissinger's statement was much less peremptory in tone. He said: "... I think we should keep in mind that detente cannot be used as a means of asking the Soviet Union to take care of all our problems on our side of the line, and a correct analysis of the situation in Portugal should emphasize or will emphasize that many of the problems in Portugal have indigenous roots and others have to do with Western countries, but I repeat what I have said previously that a substantial activity of any outside

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six months from date of issue

6 AUGUST 1975

- 7 -

country in Portugal would be considered inconsistent with the spirit and indeed the letter of the CSCE declaration."

The article also reported remarks by President Ford and other Western leaders defending their interests against alleged Soviet efforts to use the CSCE to demoralize and divide the Western alliance. It played up President Ford's statements affirming a continuing U.S. commitment to NATO, his rejecting of the notion that the CSCE represents a de facto recognition of Soviet dominance in East Europe, and his expressed determination to continue an active U.S. policy throughout the continent. The report went on to cite FRG Chancellor Schmidt's position on peaceful change of borders and desire for a reunified Germany as a challenge to Soviet ambitions at the conference, highlighted French President Giscard's warning on the continuing need for a strong Western defense despite the CSCE, and made a rare favorable reference to British Prime Minister Wilson in noting his defense of continued Four Power rights and responsibilities concerning Berlin and Germany.

A 2 August NCNA report focused on remarks by President Ford and other U.S. officials on key CSCE issues such as the inviolability of frontiers, prior notification for military exercises, free exchange of people and ideas, and economic and technical cooperation, presenting them as diametrically opposed to Brezhnev's interpretations on the same issues. The report claimed the remarks are further proof that the CSCE declaration is "an empty document" that serves only "the needs of the Soviet Union and the United States in their contention for hegemony in Europe." Another 2 August NCNA report pegged to the CSCE favorably noted that U.S. disengagement from Indochina had allowed U.S. leaders to "shorten their battle fronts" and had prompted Washington "to take one measure after another to turn its greater attention back to Europe." It cited remarks by President Ford and Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger at NATO meetings this spring as evidence that Washington has "minced no words by saying that global strategic readjustment was being carried out by the United States with a view to protecting Europe and stepping up U.S. contention with the Soviet Union in Europe and its flanks."

6 AUGUST 1975

- 8 -

## DRV IGNORES FORD MEETINGS WITH BREZHNEV, EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS

Reflecting longstanding Vietnamese misgivings about Soviet-U.S. policies of detente, monitored Hanoi media have failed even to mention President Ford's meetings with Brezhnev in Helsinki and his visits to Eastern Europe. The only known radio reports on the President's European trip were brief news items on 29 July on his stopover in the FRG. The radio noted, in a Vietnamese-language broadcast, that the President was en route to the Conference on European Security and Cooperation which was to be held in Helsinki, but provided no further information on the conference. It charged that a statement by Ford in the FRG on U.S. commitments "interfered in West Berlin's internal affairs" and was "an insolent challenge to the people of the GDR and world public opinion."

Hanoi media had not completely ignored other recent U.S.-Soviet meetings but instead had cryptically reported President Ford's talks with Brezhnev in Vladivostok in November last year, Nixon's visit to Moscow in June-July 1974, and Brezhnev's June 1973 visit to the United States. Prior to the signing of the January 1973 peace agreement North Vietnam did not directly mention U.S. summits with Moscow and Peking and openly indicated opposition to such meetings in principle. Thus, Hanoi media did not carry reports of President Nixon's 1972 trips to Peking and Moscow but media comment was openly critical of policies of accommodation with the United States and reflected Hanoi's concern that Vietnamese interests might be sacrificed by its allies in the interest of detente.

\* \* \* \* \*

## C O R R E C T I O N S

The following corrections should be made in the 30 July TRENDS, page 1, EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, "Moscow Hails 'Charter for Peaceful Coexistence' in Europe:

+ Last paragraph, second line should read: the final document as of equal importance, whether the ten . . .

+ Last paragraph, last two lines should read: Moscow has clearly placed primary emphasis on recognition of the territorial status quo, as reflected in the Soviet interpretation of . . .

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- 9 -

## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

### MOSCOW NOTES SALT PROGRESS IN FORD-BREZHNEV TALKS

Against a background of broad coverage and lavish praise for the CSCE summit in Helsinki, Moscow's attention to the 30 July and 2 August meetings between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev was strictly low-key. Brief TASS and domestic radio reports treated them without fanfare as working meetings, stressed the good atmosphere during the talks and noted that SALT was the key issue. Soviet reporting on the second meeting conveyed a distinct impression of progress on SALT during the discussions. Soviet media commentary on SALT continues to project confidence that the remaining obstacles in the talks are not sufficient to place a fall signing in jeopardy.

A recording of Brezhnev's session with the news media after the 30 July meeting, carried on Moscow domestic radio, included his statement that "strategic armaments and a new agreement were the central issues of our discussions." The TASS report of the 2 August meeting said that issues "on which agreement was reached during the talks" will be turned over to the delegations in Geneva, while negotiations on "remaining problems" will continue.

**TROFIMENKO ARTICLE** An article by G.A. Trofimenko in the 27 July SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA said that "as far as can be judged there are no insuperable obstacles now" to insuring that the Vladivostok accord "is embodied in a specific agreement by the end of the year." Though Trofimenko's primary purpose in the article was to criticize a series of recent statements on U.S.-Soviet strategic relations made by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, especially Schlesinger's reported view that increased U.S. military strength is not only compatible with detente but reinforces it, he did not suggest directly that the course of the SALT negotiations had been adversely affected thereby.\*

Trofimenko also blamed the Pentagon for some of the problems that have delayed the process of negotiating a SALT TWO agreement. He said that to secure the Pentagon's approval of the terms of the

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\* Defense Minister Grechko and other Soviet military spokesmen have made similar claims on behalf of Soviet military might, while a number of USA Institute analysts have argued that military strength alone could not insure peace. See the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 23 August 1973, "Soviet Debate Over the Role of Military Power During Detente," and the TRENDS of 24 July 1974, p 11.

- 10 -

SALT I agreement, the U.S. Administration had to agree to new strategic weapon programs, including the B-1 bomber and the Trident SSBN. According to Trofimenko, the go-ahead for such an "extensive, longterm development program" had "complicated the elaboration" of a followon agreement. Soviet commentary on SALT TWO has generally avoided apportioning blame for the prolongation of the negotiations, pointing instead to the understandably more complex issues now involved. However, another USA Institute observer, M.A. Mil'shteyn, implied that Watergate had also slowed the negotiations, in an article in the February 1975 issue of USA.

- 11 -

## U. S. - EAST EUROPE RELATIONS

### ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA VOICE SATISFACTION WITH FORD VISITS

Romanian and Yugoslav media treatment of President Ford's visits on 2-3 and 3-4 August, respectively, has been warm on atmospherics but non-specific as to the details of the discussions. Romanian media have thus far refrained from commenting on President Ford's offer of flood relief, although the fact that an offer was made was noted in the communique published in the 4 August ROMANIA LIBERA. Similarly, Yugoslav media have avoided mentioning that military cooperation was discussed between President Ford and Tito aside from a TANJUG text of the President's 4 August statement in which he referred to this discussion.

Romanian media had provided warm atmospherics for the President's arrival with commentaries welcoming Congressional approval on 28 July of the long-awaited most-favored-nation status. The party daily SCINTEIA on the 29th typically characterized MFN approval as removing a major obstacle to the "overall development of friendly" U.S.-Romanian relations. Ceausescu also underscored the significance of MFN in acknowledging in a 2 August toast that Romania "will reap great benefits" although he cautioned Romanian citizens that their products "must now demonstrate their technical, economic and qualitative competitiveness."

Ceausescu, who assessed his talks with the President as "particularly positive" and called for even closer cooperation, showed concern for Moscow's sensitivities in asserting twice during his 2 August toast that there is no longer anything "special" about a U.S. Presidential visit to Romania. He had similarly taken care to point up Bucharest's "good" relations with Moscow during Kissinger's November 1974 visit.

**YUGOSLAV VISIT** Belgrade comment surrounding the President's visit to Yugoslavia portrayed bilateral relations between the two countries in glowing terms, but voiced concern over continued anti-Tito activities of emigres in the United States. A TANJUG report on the President's 4 August talks with Premier Bijedic pointed out that "note was made" of the need to prevent such activities.

Tito voiced "great" satisfaction with the results of his talks with the President, particularly regarding the Administration's views on the international economic situation. Speaking at a joint news conference on the 4th, Tito asserted that following his talks with the President and Secretary Kissinger, he expected

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- 12 -

that the discussion of international economic problems at next month's special session of the UN General Assembly would achieve positive results.

In discussing other international problems, Tito voiced "particular concern" over the Mideast and Cyprus in view of the potential danger they posed for the entire Mediterranean. He also criticized the "inflexibility" of Israel on several occasions. Contrary to Western press reports, Tito did not assert that Yugoslavia and the United States shared identical views on the Mideast. Speaking at the 4 August press conference, however, he noted the identity of U.S. and Yugoslav views regarding "anxiety" over the Mideast situation.

6 AUGUST 1975

- 13 -

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## PEKING PRESSES CHARGES AGAINST SOVIET ASIAN SECURITY PLAN

Recent Chinese commentaries in PEOPLE'S DAILY and NCNA have alleged that the Soviet Union is exploiting the momentum of the conclusion of the European Security Conference and the U.S. military pullback from Asia following the end of the Indochina war to press its longstanding proposal for an Asian collective security arrangement.\* NCNA commentaries on 29 and 31 July asserted for the first time that the Soviet Union was attempting to link its scheme with the proposal for neutralization of Southeast Asia sponsored by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and with Nepal's call for a "zone of peace." Other Peking comment has advised Asian nations that they have more to fear from Soviet expansionism than from a continuing U.S. military presence in their countries.

The 29 July NCNA commentary noted that "of late" Soviet officials have been pushing Asian collective security as part of a "new move" in the wake of the CSCE and the Indochina war to displace U.S. influence and establish Soviet hegemony in Asia. To support its warnings, NCNA pointed to Moscow's growing naval presence in Southeast Asian waters, its longstanding opposition to ASEAN states' claims of jurisdiction over the Malacca Straits, and past Soviet statements opposing the ASEAN neutralization scheme. It also noted allegedly growing Soviet espionage activities and promotion of pro-Soviet political forces in Southeast Asia as further evidence that Moscow has altered its stance on neutralization merely to woo ASEAN states into the Soviet "orbit."

The 31 July NCNA report sounded a related theme, criticizing Soviet efforts to link its security plan with Nepal's call for a "zone of peace." The report cited an editorial in a Nepalese weekly which said that the proposal is motivated by the Soviet ambition to make Asians fight among themselves and to expand its own sphere of influence," a criticism strongly reminiscent of charges formerly aimed at the "Nixon Doctrine."

Other recent NCNA reports have supported the ASEAN solidarity efforts as conducive to keeping the area free from superpower control. For instance, NCNA reports on 25 and 28 July reported evidence of greater

\* Peking's recent propaganda line on Asia, including the Chinese call for an Asian "anti-hegemony front" against Moscow, is discussed in the TRENDS of 16 July 1975, pages 11-12.

- 14 -

regional cooperation during Thai Prime Minister Khukrit's recent visits to the Philippines and Singapore, noting especially the growing harmony of foreign and economic policies among the ASEAN states. And an NCNA report on 29 July explicitly portrayed ASEAN cooperation as an exemplary means to secure regional independence from outside interference.

**U.S. ROLE** In contrast to its sharpened attack on the Soviet security plan and military presence, Peking has portrayed U.S. influence in Asia as a relative source of stability and has depicted some recent U.S. military moves there as understandable responses on the part of a great power to the unbridled expansion of its adversary. For instance, NCNA on 30 July reported without criticism the U.S. Congress' 28 July approval of President Ford's plan to expand the U.S. military base on Diego Garcia, depicting the U.S. action as a reaction to Soviet military moves which NCNA described as the main source of insecurity and threat to the region.

A 28 July article by prominent PEOPLE'S DAILY foreign affairs commentator Fan Hsiu-chiu went so far as to rebuke Soviet propaganda efforts pressing for U.S. military withdrawal from Asia as attempts to clear the way for Moscow's Asian security plan. Warning of Moscow's Asian ambitions, the article referred to Soviet military bases in Mongolia, on Japanese-claimed islands, and in the Indian Ocean region, noting bluntly that the USSR "is attempting to take advantage of the Asian people's tendency to demand the dismantling of U.S. military bases as a means of secretly sneaking into some Asian areas to seek new bases and spheres of influence." NCNA on the 29th showed similar forbearance toward the U.S. presence in advising Asians that they were better off facing a U.S. military presence than confronting ambitious Soviet "expansionism." Following the recent U.S. "strategic readjustment" in Asia, the article stated, the USSR, "like a hungry tiger hiding for a long time and now coming out, is more ferocious than the decaying U.S. imperialism."

- 15 -

## KOREA

### DPRK REGISTERS FORMAL OPPOSITION TO ROK UN MEMBERSHIP

A 5 August DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement responded to South Korea's 30 July application for UN membership by charging that the ROK is not qualified for membership as a puppet regime and because its participation in the Vietnam War morally disqualifies it under terms of the UN Charter. The argument that the Seoul government is a U.S. "marionette regime devoid of any independence" and therefore ineligible for UN membership has been standard in DPRK propaganda, but the charge that the South's UN membership would "eventually impair the principle and idea of the UN Charter" is new. Pyongyang has not previously argued that the South's international behavior, such as in Vietnam, should bar it from UN membership.\* The charge that UN membership for the ROK would be an "open violation of the UN Charter" was also made by a DPRK Foreign Ministry official in a 5 August news conference reported by KCNA on the 6th.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement had also claimed the ROK application was an "open violation" of the decision of the 28th UN General Assembly encouraging North and South Korea to work toward reunification, as well as a product of the "two Koreas plot" of the United States. Repeating a standard North Korean line dating from a June 1973 Kim Il-song speech, the statement urged that Korea enter the UN as a unified country, or as a single entity under the name of the Confederal Republic of Koryo after a north-south confederation has been established.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement did not tie the ROK application for UN membership to an attempt to keep U.S. troops in South Korea, but accompanying commentary has done so. According to a 4 August KCNA report, a MINJU CHOSEN commentary, for example, argued that by applying for admission, Seoul intended to hamper a solution to the "basic question" of withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South. The same commentary also suggested that the United States recommended South Korea apply as a "condition for bargaining over the application of North and South Vietnam for separate admission," the first time DPRK media have raised this issue and an indication of Pyongyang's concern that the admission of the two Vietnams could become tied to the issue of Korean membership in the United Nations.

\* A September 1973 DPRK government memorandum for the 28th UN General Assembly cited ROK actions in Vietnam as an example of Seoul's "morally degraded and corrupt" nature, but not as a threat to the UN Charter.

- 16 -

## INDOCHINA

### CAMBODIA NOTES LE DUAN VISIT, DISCUSSES FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

A terse "press communique" broadcast by Phnom Penh radio on 3 August announcing the recent visit to Cambodia of a Vietnam Workers Party delegation led by First Secretary Le Duan suggests that relations between the two countries remain strained. While North Vietnam is the first nation to publicly send a delegation to Cambodia since the communist victory last April, the reserved description of the meeting in the communique was in contrast to communiques issued after previous Vietnamese-Cambodian meetings. And just one day after the announcement of the latest visit, Phnom Penh radio reported the construction of Cambodian military fortifications on islands in the Gulf of Siam which had been held by the South Vietnamese Government prior to the communist takeover in Vietnam. Phnom Penh radio in recent days has broken new ground on other foreign policy issues, for the first time referring to postwar aid from China and favorably noting Bangkok's interest in normalizing relations with Cambodia.

LE DUAN VISIT      Perhaps in deference to Cambodian reticence since the communist takeover to publicize information on the structure of its postwar leadership, the communique on the Le Duan visit did not indicate when or where in Cambodia the visit took place or what Cambodian leaders took part in talks with the Vietnamese. Members of the Vietnamese delegation, other than Le Duan, were similarly not specified. Hanoi's report on the visit, carried by VNA on the 3d, was identical to the Phnom Penh radio press communique, although not labeled a communique. An editorial on the visit in the North Vietnamese party paper NHAN DAN on the same day provided no additional details.

By contrast, prior to the end of the Indochina war, Cambodian and Vietnamese media had given extensive media coverage to visits between delegations from the two nations, with the standard lengthy banquet speeches, editorial comment, and joint statements of policy.\* The fact that Le Duan headed the Vietnamese delegation

\* For discussions of previous Khmer-Vietnamese visits, see the TRENDS of 3 April 1974, pages 9-11, on Khieu Samphan's 28 March-1 April 1974 visit to Hanoi; of 3 July 1974, pages 9-11, on Khieu Samphan's 11-13 June visit to the South Vietnamese "liberated zone;" and of 15 January 1975, pages 15-16, on PRG President Huynh Tan Phat's 25-29 December 1974 visit to the Cambodian "liberated zone."

6 AUGUST 1975

- 17 -

is consistent with past Vietnamese practice. Following the Paris peace agreement, the first secretary similarly led delegations to Hanoi's major communist allies--to Peking in June 1973 and to Moscow the following month--and he headed a delegation to Laos in November 1973, his last publicized trip abroad.

Consistent with the publicized results of past Vietnamese-Cambodian meetings, the communique on the visit said that unanimity was reached on all questions raised during the visit. The NHAN DAN editorial noted, as the paper had following earlier Vietnamese-Cambodian meetings, that "good results" had been achieved during the visit. However, the description of the atmosphere surrounding the visit was less effusive than during past visits. Thus, whereas the joint communique on PRG President Phat's December 1974 talks with Khieu Samphan had said the meetings had been conducted in an atmosphere of "the most cordial and warmest friendship and with militant solidarity," Le Duan reportedly had "cordial conversations in an atmosphere of brotherhood" during his recent visit. The joint communique on Khieu Samphan's April 1974 visit to Hanoi said his visit had been "crowned with success and greatly contributed to the strengthening and consolidation of the militant solidarity and great friendship" between the two countries and had translated "in a brilliant way the profound sentiments of combative solidarity and indestructible fraternal friendship" that binds the two peoples. By contrast, Le Duan's current visit was said merely to have "further strengthened the longstanding bonds of militant solidarity and friendship" between Vietnam and Cambodia.

**BORDER ISLANDS** On 4 August Phnom Penh radio reported that Cambodian forces had occupied and fortified Koh Tunsay and Koh Puo islands in the Gulf of Siam near South Vietnam "at a time when the U.S. imperialists and their Thieu puppet clique were immediately swept from our territory." The report was the first specific Phnom Penh reference to military occupation of islands also claimed by South Vietnam since the height of the Mayaguez incident last May. At that time, Phnom Penh radio had referred several times to military measures being carried out on islands also claimed by the South Vietnamese noting, for instance, in an 18 May broadcast that Cambodian maritime forces on Koh Wai Island were to be congratulated for their heroism against the United States. The radio's only other recent reference to Cambodian military action on adjacent islands was contained in a 25 July Phnom Penh radio report noting that people on Rong Sanlem Island--which is situated off Sihanoukville--and "other islands of our territorial sea" were "always carrying weapons" to "protect their revolutionary administration."

- 18 -

PRC AID      Phnom Penh radio's acknowledgment of continuing Chinese aid was contained in a 3 August report of a 1 August greetings message sent by Khieu Samphan to PRC Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying on China's Army Day. The message cited the "longstanding and radiant bonds of militant solidarity and fraternal friendship" between Cambodia and China and noted that Cambodia continues to receive Chinese "support and assistance" in the "new phase" of the Cambodian revolution since liberation. This is the first time since the communist takeover that Phnom Penh radio has carried the text of a Cambodian leader's message to any foreign country, and it is also the first time that the radio has carried a statement signed by Khieu Samphan since it broadcast the 28 April special national congress communique.

THAILAND      In a weekly radio international news feature on 27 July, Phnom Penh publicly welcomed Thai Prime Minister Khukrit's recent statement that Thailand hoped to normalize relations with Cambodia. The radio commented that "the best prospects ever" currently exist for "good relations" between the two states. Maintaining that Cambodia and Thailand have "a long tradition of peaceful coexistence and friendly relations," the radio placed Thailand in the same category with Vietnam and Laos as "brotherly peoples" with whom Cambodia seeks to coexist. The same radio feature on 3 August for the first time favorably reported the policies of other noncommunist neighbors, attributing statements critical of SEATO to Malaysian Prime Minister Razak and "the governments" of Australia and New Zealand.

6 AUGUST 1975

- 19 -

## HANOI MEDIA STEP UP CRITICISM OF BANGKOK POLICY TOWARD U.S.

Hanoi media have released a barrage of criticism of Bangkok in the past month, abandoning the restraint which had characterized public Vietnamese statements on Thailand following DRV-Thai talks on normalization of relations, held in Bangkok from 21 to 29 May. Hanoi's criticism, in both media comment and official Foreign Ministry spokesmen's statements, has centered on the Thai Government's alleged "collusion" with the United States and has questioned the sincerity of Thai Government statements advocating friendly relations with neighboring countries.

The recent Hanoi comment has not mentioned the DRV-Thai consultations which were to have continued in Hanoi following the opening round in Bangkok, and there has thus been no public acknowledgment of Thai press reports in mid-July that the Hanoi talks had been put off until the end of August. The timing of the Vietnamese campaign against Bangkok, beginning shortly after Thai Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot's 30 June-6 July visit to China, suggests that Hanoi may have concluded that with the establishment of PRC-Thai relations Bangkok had perhaps moderated its avowed intention to sever ties with the United States and advance toward rapprochement with Vietnam. Hanoi media had reported without comment the establishment of formal relations between Peking and Bangkok during the Khukrit visit.

COMMENT ON THAILAND  
SINCE MID-JULY

The first major outburst in Hanoi's propaganda campaign against Bangkok came in commentaries in the North Vietnamese party paper NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 19 and 20 July, respectively. These were apparently triggered by a Bangkok announcement that Thai naval units would participate in a SEATO exercise with American forces. Hanoi's displeasure was registered officially on 22 July in a statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman which scored both the joint naval exercise and a recent statement attributed to Prime Minister Khukrit that SEATO should not be "dissolved" since it could still serve the member countries in various nonmilitary fields.

The 19 and 20 July press commentaries and subsequent comment illustrated Hanoi's concern over Bangkok's continuing military ties with the United States. NHAN DAN, for example, questioned the motives of the Thai leaders in participating in the scheduled naval exercise and asked rhetorically whether the maneuvers were intended to "intimidate" the Indochinese and Thai peoples, and whether Bangkok intended to pave the way for further U.S. military activities in the area. The commentary denounced the joint exercise as a "serious provocation and hostile act by the Khukrit administration against the Vietnamese people."

- 20 -

The 22 July Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, focusing on Khukrit's statement favoring the maintenance of SEATO, accused the Thai administration of "stubbornly trying to preserve" SEATO with the aim of "continuing to serve the U.S. imperialists in the interference in and aggression against the Southeast Asian countries." North Vietnam appeared determined to continue pressure on the issue of Thai military cooperation with the United States, and this was underlined when Hanoi media failed to take note of Khukrit's less favorable stance on SEATO in the 24 July communique issued at the conclusion of his visit to the Philippines. Both in the communique and at press conferences on the 24th and 25th Khukrit endorsed the principle that SEATO be gradually "phased out," but a 26 July Hanoi radio commentary ignored his statement on SEATO while criticizing other remarks Khukrit made at his press conferences.

In the last week of July Hanoi issued two more official protests concerning Thailand--a Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 26th condemning the U.S. use of Thai bases for U-2 flights over Indochina and a spokesman's statement on the 31st endorsing a PRG note to Bangkok restating South Vietnam's claim to ships and planes taken to Thailand at the end of the war by evacuating South Vietnamese. Like the earlier protest on the 22d, these statements linked their complaints to the question of improving relations with Bangkok.

The 26 July statement charged that Thai permission for the U.S. to use Thai bases for its reconnaissance flights was proof that Thailand was "still pursuing the old policy of the dictatorial military regime already overthrown by the Thai people" and did not correspond to Thailand's "alleged desire" to have good relations with Indochinese countries. The 31 July statement suggested that Thailand should "prove" the sincerity of its statements on good neighborly relations by returning the evacuated ships and planes and "renounce the former dictatorial regimes' policy of colluding with the United States to oppose the neighboring countries." While Hanoi's official statement on the PRG note was in line with DRV practice in early May when it endorsed a number of PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements on the disposition of the planes and ships in Thailand, it marked a departure from Hanoi's behavior immediately following the Thai-DRV talks in Bangkok. When the PRG sent a note to Thailand on 30 May--the day after the Bangkok talks ended--demanding that Thailand return a South Vietnamese tugboat, Hanoi failed to provide its usual official statement of support.

Press and radio comment accompanying the DRV spokesmen's protests to Thailand have raised other charges against the Bangkok government,

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- 21 -

including complaints that the Thais are cooperating with the United States in the construction of a large radar station in Chiangmai Province and that they are harboring "reactionaries" from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos who plan to carry out subversion in Indochina. A 26 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, from the "Current Affairs Review" column, not only reiterated Vietnamese objections to the continued presence of U.S. military forces in Thailand, but also expressed skepticism about whether Bangkok was seriously pursuing negotiations with the United States for the complete withdrawal of those forces.

**BACKGROUND** Although Hanoi comment following the DRV-Thai talks at the end of May had avoided the harsh criticism of Bangkok expressed in recent weeks, North Vietnamese circumspection about the Thai leadership was apparent even then. Thus, for example, a 7 June article by NHAN DAN's authoritative "Commentator" noted that it was "entirely possible to resolve the remaining problems and normalize relations," but that the Thai Government must recognize the demands of the Thai people, "clearly realize the great changes in Southeast Asia," be determined to implement a policy of peace, independence, and "true" neutrality, and "definitely separate" from America's "neocolonialist policy."\*

Cautious Vietnamese optimism about Thai policies had been reflected in a 12 June article by NHAN DAN's international news editor Quang Thai. The article, reviewing the history of the independence struggle in Southeast Asia, had noted that the number of American troops in the area was "decreasing rapidly," that the last B-52's had left, that SEATO "exists in form only," and that the struggle movement in Thailand had developed over the last two years to the point where Washington had been "forced" to agree to a total withdrawal from Thailand.

Hanoi's careful handling of its relations with Bangkok during June was suggested by a 19 June Hanoi radio report which vigorously denied Bangkok reports that North Vietnam was infiltrating weapons into Thailand. The radio denounced the charge as a "fabrication" and complained that the appearance of the allegations "prior to the forthcoming arrival in the DRV of a Thai delegation for more talks on the normalization of relations" was calculated to "poison the friendly atmosphere that prevailed after the first round of talks." This was Hanoi's last known mention of the anticipated bilateral consultations in Hanoi.

\* The 7 June Commentator article and other DRV comment on the DRV-Thai talks are discussed in the TRENDS of 11 June 1975, pages 11-12.

- 22 -

## PORTUGAL

## USSR CRITICIZES "WESTERN MEDIA" INTERFERENCE, ATTACKS SOARES

As the efforts to form a new government in Portugal have dragged on inconclusively, Moscow has continued to indicate support for the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) and Prime Minister Goncalves, but has indirectly expressed concern over the delay as "the political situation continues to deteriorate." Western media have come in for criticism for spreading "fabrications" about Soviet interference while "crudely meddling" in Portugal's affairs themselves, and Moscow has repeated its contention that the Portuguese situation has no connection with detente. And Socialist Party leader Soares has again been assailed in LITERARY GAZETTE for his "demagogic attacks" against the MFA, Goncalves, and the Portuguese Communist Party.

**WESTERN "MEDDLING"** Moscow has again lashed out at "Western media" for interference in Portugal's affairs, while brushing off "falsehoods" that the Soviet Union has been doing the same. A Yuriy Shalygin commentary, broadcast in English to Asia on 24 July, dismissed as a "fabrication" the unidentified "claim that Moscow subsidizes the Portuguese communists." Shalygin in turn accused Western media of going so far as to suggest what men should be in the Portuguese Government, and cited the Paris LE MONDE as indulging in "outright instigation," trying to "prod reactionary groups." The Common Market came in for criticism as well, Shalygin asserting that in denying aid to Portugal unless it kept to a pluralistic democracy, the EEC was also "doing some prodding."

Maintaining the position that the Portuguese situation has nothing to do with detente, IZVESTIYA observer V. Matveyev, in an international review on 29 July, remarked that Western circles opposed to detente tried to portray the situation in Portugal "tendentiously," as "an 'example' of the kind of one-sided operation of the detente process from which, they say, the Soviet Union gains." Matveyev complained that attempts were being made to depict the "complication of the domestic situation" in Portugal as having "some sort of relevance to the process of detente in Europe."

Moscow has apparently not taken note of Secretary Kissinger's remarks about Portugal in his 30 July press conference in Helsinki, when he said that "detente cannot be used as a means of asking the Soviet Union to take care of all of our problems on our side of the line," but added that "a substantial activity

by any outside country in Portugal would be considered inconsistent with the spirit and indeed the letter of the CSCE declaration." Moscow has also passed over in silence President Ford's comment, in a U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT interview published on 4 August, that "I think it is undoubtedly recognized that the Soviet Union is quietly helping the communist elements in Portugal."

ATTACK ON SOARES      Following up its 11 June criticism of Socialist Party leader Mario Soares,\* LITERARY GAZETTE on 30 July carried a report by Soviet radio and television commentator I. Fesunenکو portraying Soares as rallying "reactionary and counterrevolutionary forces" against the MFA, Prime Minister Goncalves and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). Fesunenکو did concede that "it cannot be concluded that there are any links between the Socialists and the pogromists" attacking PCP centers around the country. But he maintained that "the anticommunist hysteria unleashed by Mario Soares has served as the nutrient medium in which the bacilli of fascism have begun to multiply so rapidly."

Fesunenکو professed to see the situation as having "on the whole now been normalized" with the establishment of the ruling triumvirate and the announcement "soon" of the composition of the fifth provisional government. But Moscow seemed to suggest some impatience over the delay in forming the government when TASS on 4 August reported PCP head Alvaro Cunhal as declaring that "a new government should be formed as soon as possible" because the political situation in the country was deteriorating "as a result of delays with settlement of the government crisis."

Moscow as before has implied support for Prime Minister Goncalves, TASS on 31 July reporting that the Portuguese Revolutionary Council had "reaffirmed its confidence" in the way Goncalves was discharging his "difficult and responsible task." And Oleg Skalkin, in a 3 August PRAVDA article, also noted that the Council "expressed trust" in the prime minister, and that the Portuguese public supported the decision to create the executive triumvirate composed of Goncalves, President Costa Gomes, and security forces commander Otelo de Carvalho. In PRAVDA on 31 July, V. Sedykh reported de Carvalho as saying the triumvirate arrangement "would make it possible to manage affairs in the country better." Sedykh noted that de Carvalho stressed "the 'dynamic' nature" of the Portuguese

\* See the 2 July 1975 TRENDS, page 25, for a discussion of the 11 June LITERARY GAZETTE article.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 AUGUST 1975

- 24 -

revolution, but he ignored Carvalho's remark that mass arrests of "counterrevolutionaries" might become necessary, because "it is becoming impossible to conduct a socialist revolution by completely peaceful means."

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#### C O R R E C T I O N

In the 30 July 1975 TREFOS, page 27, second NOTE, "Moscow on Portuguese Triumvirate," the second line should read: Portuguese Armed Forces Movement (MFA), Moscow has indicated approval of the MFA Assembly's 25 July decision . . .

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- 25 -

## CHINA

### LO JUI-CHING APPEARANCE HIGHLIGHTS PEKING ARMY DAY RECEPTION

Repeating last year's Army Day performance, Peking this year again used the traditional Army Day eve reception on 31 July to mark the return to public life of a former top PLA leader, listing ex-PLA Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ching as "also present" in its 31 July NCNA reception report. Last year, former Acting Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu, now first deputy chief of staff, reappeared on Army Day. The reception this year was attended by fewer top leaders than in 1974, when Chou En-lai led the largest leadership turnout for Army Day since Lin Piao's fall in 1971. This year's reception turnout was led by Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying, whose toast to the PLA called on the army to deepen its study of Marxist theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat and to continue to grasp revolution and promote production. Also present were PLA chief of staff Teng Hsiao-ping, head of the PLA general political department Chang Chun-chiao, and seven other Politburo members or alternates.

Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen appeared in Shanghai according to a separate 31 July NCNA report on celebrations in Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin. Wang was the only leader named in the report and was identified both as party vice chairman and vice chairman of the military commission, the first time he has been publicly identified in the latter post.\* Wang had not appeared publicly in Shanghai, his power base before vaulting to the number three party post, since September 1973.

For the third year in succession Army Day did not trigger a central newspaper editorial. Peking newspapers frontpaged a portrait of Mao and printed selected quotations from his works stressing the need for discipline and unity within the army.

Lo Jui-ching, a major rival of Lin Piao, was the first major victim of the cultural revolution. He was purged in 1965, when, in opposition to Lin, he appeared to favor a more active Chinese policy in Indochina. After his purge he was criticized for seeking to place professionalism and military technique above politics. The fall of Lin and increased PLA attention to military training

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\* The 31 July NCNA English and Chinese version of the report referred to Wang as a Military Commission vice chairman. A later English repeat of the item dropped the vice chairman reference and only used his party title, as did Shanghai radio's 31 July radio report on the Army Day meeting. NCNA Chinese has not carried a repeat.

- 26 -

had long foreshadowed the possibility of his return. Lo Jui-ching's return to public view, after a ten year hiatus, serves to emphasize Peking's current stress on the need for greater unity within the PLA, particularly at a time when the army is being called upon to quiet labor unrest and to safeguard production from factional struggle in some areas of the country.\*

Provincial radio reports on local activities to welcome the anniversary of the army did not reveal any major leadership changes. Eight of the PRC's eleven military region commanders appeared in their localities for Army Day celebrations; Ting Sheng, Wang Pi-cheng and Han Hsien-chu did not appear. Of the three only Han appears to be in dubious political health. He was under heavy poster attack in the earlier stages of the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius last year, and has not appeared publicly in Lanchow since his first appearance there after being transferred from Fukien in January 1974. His rare public appearances since then, most recently for May Day, have all been in Peking.

\* Peking's decision to use the PLA to insure order and production in Chekiang is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 July 1975, pages 21-22.

- 27 -

## NOTE

LIFTING OF OAS CUBA SANCTIONS: Havana radio promptly acknowledged the measures taken by the Organization of American States (OAS) during its 16-30 July meetings to revoke the 1964 sanctions against Cuba. While still expressing contempt for the OAS, Havana's response has been in keeping with the regime's less emotional attitude toward the organization in recent years. It may also reflect the fact that the outcome was anticipated, as suggested by a "Letter from Freddy"--reported by Havana's domestic service on 11 July--predicting that "everything will turn out well" and the "irregular and scandalous" sanctions would be lifted. Predictably, Premier Fidel Castro refrained from comment on the OAS session in his annual 26 July speech; according to a LATIN report on the 30th, when asked by newsmen about the final OAS decision, Castro "answered only with a broad smile." The most authoritative response has come from Foreign Trade Minister Marcolo Fernandez, who was questioned by foreign newsmen while attending a meeting in Panama. As reported by Havana's international service on 3 August, Fernandez said the OAS actions "do not affect Cuba," which "does not want to be a member of the OAS and never will be." He added, however, that the moves might help "solve the problem" of Latin countries which wanted renewed ties with Cuba. Moscow, consistently characterizing the sanctions as "imposed on the OAS by Washington," reported the various stages of the OAS meetings. Soviet comment has emphasized the usual twin themes with regard to Cuba and the OAS: that Cuba's economic and diplomatic successes--due especially to its relationship with the USSR and the socialist world--have defeated the blockade, and that the OAS is "crumbling" under the weight of growing Latin unwillingness to "follow Washington's policy."

6 AUGUST 1975

- 1 -

## APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 28 JULY - 3 AUGUST 1975

Moscow (2312 items)

European Security Conference	(6%)	32%
[Brezhnev Speech]	(--)	7%
China	(5%)	3%
OAU Summit, Uganda	(--)	3%
[Soviet Leaders' Greetings]	(--)	2%
Soyuz-Apollo Space Mission	(22%)	2%

Peking (979 items)

OAU Summit, Uganda	(1%)	11%
International Swimming and Diving Meet, Peking	(--)	8%
European Security Conference	(5%)	7%
Superpower Contention in Southeast Asia	(--)	5%
PLA 48th Anniversary	(--)	3%
PRC-Malagasy Economic Aid Agreement	(--)	3%
PRC Satellite Launch	(1%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.